

11 December 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion of the Importance of the Chilean
Solidarity Movement (CSM) with DDO and DDI Specialists

25X1 1. I convened a group from OCI together with []
[] to discuss CSM and its importance in Europe in the
light of Arnold Silver's suggestion to the DCI that the US would
benefit substantially by disassociating itself from the Chilean
government and condemning the leader's brutality. The talking
25X1 paper for the discussion was the memorandum of 29 November, pre-
pared in DDO by [] at my request.

2. The OCI analysts all argue that this paper overstates
the importance of the CSM as a rallying point for anti-US acti-
vities in Europe, though no one denies that it has some importance.

- It is probably most significant in Italy, Portugal
and Scandinavia; least so in Britain and Germany.
France is in between.
- In all cases, OCI argues that local considerations
and local issues dictate whether socialists and com-
munists come together or stay apart far more than
geologically remote issues like Chile.
- OCI also argues that no European government (as
distinct from certain private organizations) has
shown itself very exercised about US policy toward
Chile and none have exerted strong or recurrent
pressures on the US to do anything.
- The qualified exception is Portugal where the leaders
of the Provisional government show a marked sensitivity
that US policy toward Chile may be a model for US
policy toward Portugal.
- In most cases, however, the real lesson that the left
has drawn from Chile is not the wickedness of the US
but rather the lesson that is exemplified in the
"historic compromise" of the PCI that they should
accommodate to the Christian Democrats in a junior-

partner relationship for the foreseeable future or the lesson apparently drawn by the Soviets that Western European communist parties should not rush to gain control because of the risks.

- Having said all this, no one denies that the Chile question has indeed replaced Vietnam as a convenient grounds for rallying anti-US sentiment almost everywhere in Europe and especially for emphasizing the common front between communists, socialists and left-wing Christians -- three groups who can agree on almost nothing else.
- There is no respected voice raised in defense of the Chilean junta or of US policy toward it anywhere in Europe. The few voices who do undertake such a defense are the kind of supporters who don't do us any good.
- Finally, it was suggested that any representations from the DCI on this matter might best take the form of ways in which the interests of the Intelligence Community, and in particular the Agency, have been hardened by the Chilean vulnerability. Harmful affects break down into two types: One consists of our friends who genuinely disapprove of Chile and US policy toward it and are therefore less disposed than formerly to cooperate with us; and those who are becoming persuaded that the US cannot keep a secret (as a result of revelations in our own press and who therefore get nervous about cooperating with the US on their own).

3. I told the group I would prepare a memo for the Director reflecting the main points in this discussion and the principle practical points emerging from it, and would forward that to him together with the factual roundup prepared by DDO.

National Intelligence Officer
for Western Europe

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SUBJECT: Ramifications of Chilean Solidarity Movement
in Western Europe

Summary

The Chilean solidarity question has replaced the Vietnamese solidarity question as the principle rallying point in Western Europe for leftist forces bent upon denigrating the United States and reducing its influence in Europe. In the fourteen months since the September 1973 coup d'etat, an extensive organizational network has been built up in Europe, supported and funded both by the Communist countries (the USSR, East Germany and Cuba are the major supporters) and by Western organizations. Major centers of exile activity are in Paris and Rome with supporting elements in Helsinki and London. Because of the strong emotional undercurrents connected with the Chilean issue and the extensive and intensive propaganda campaign which has been mounted to capitalize on them, there is practically no voice raised in Europe in defense of the Chilean Junta or in defense of the role the United States is said to have played in Chile in the recent past. The Chilean "example" is being cited to create a climate in Portugal, for instance, in which U.S. initiatives are immediately suspect. The Chilean campaign is also being used as the newest mechanism through which European non-communists are being brought into continuing cooperation with communist parties and front organizations in efforts which are basically anti-American and are intended to cast doubts on the United States' reliability, probity, and dedication to democratic principles. End Summary

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